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ABSTRACT

This Article responds to Samuel Moyn's critique of judicial
review and his endorsement ofjudicial modesty as an alternative.
By invoking the countermajoritariandifficulty, Moyn argues that
judicialoverreach has become an unwelcome global phenomenon
that should be reexamined and curbed. I reject Moyn's claim that
this kind of judicial modesty should define the role of courts for
all time. By applying the countermajoritariandifficulty beyond
its United States origins, Moyn assumes it is an unproblematic
baseline against which to measure the role of courts globally.
Moyn's vision says nothing about when it would be appropriate
for courts to rule against legislative majorities. This view of
judicial modesty is defied in constitutions such as those of South
Africa and Kenya, which explicitly provide for their manner of
interpretationand empower courts to "develop" the law. In the
often revolutionary conditions of new African democracies, the
functions expected of judicial review have a significant role both
in constituting the new order as well as in disabling the
continuation of the old order.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article responds to Samuel Moyn's sweeping critique of
judicial review and his endorsement of judicial modesty as an
alternative approach to judicial review. Moyn argues that judicial
overreach has become an unwelcome global phenomenon that should
be reexamined and curbed.' Moyn argues legislatures are the ideal
forums for the types of decisions he objects to courts making. 2 To
explain this view of judicial review, he invokes the countermajoritarian
difficulty to account for the limits of judicial review. 3 In doing so, he
endorses Justice Felix Frankfurter's notion of judicial modesty as an
4
ideal alternative to what he considers judicial overreach.

See generally Samuel Moyn, On Human Rights and Majority Politics: Felix
1.
Frankfurter'sDemocratic Theory, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1135 (2019). This response
is based on version six of Moyn's paper as revised on May 25, 2019, arguing that "no one
can doubt that the juristocratic wave of our time has been part of an empowerment of
legal elites in a global project that has reached self-evident limits. And, in Frankfurter's
own United States, where the syndrome was born and from which it was exported, the
advancement of liberal causes under countermajoritarian auspices, however effective for
a time, has long since been reversed into reactionary judicial activism. Indeed, many
anticipate that a rerun of the progressive campaign against a judiciary enforcing a
tyranny of the minority-including in the name of rights, as in the so-called First
Amendment Lochnerism of recent cases-will be in the offing sooner or later. In this
light, it is ironic that Beth Simmons has defended the democratic uses of human rights,
while also viewing not just legislation but judicial enforcement as their prized
mechanism." Id. at 1158-59.
Id. at 1144 (endorsing Frankfurter's normative commitment to democracy
2.
because it "was not that there are no rights, whether human or constitutional, but that
no one other than the people under organized systems of majority rule can politically
decide how they figure-at least when the majority has some reason or other for its policy,
besides a desire to violate minority rights.").
3.
Id. at 1137 (arguing that "[w]hat if the greatest risk is not that majorities will
trample the rights of minorities, but that minorities will continue to rule over majorities?
If so, then it is all-important to focus first of all on how to counteract this risk, including
insofar as concern for rights becomes a pretext for avoiding its realities.").
Id. at 1158-59 (noting that "no one can doubt that the juristocratic wave of
4.
our time has been part of an empowerment of legal elites in a global project that has
reached self-evident limits." Moyn further notes that "in Frankfurter's own United
States, where the syndrome was born and from which it was exported, the advancement
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This Article's response has two major claims. First, that by
adopting the historically contingent countermajoritarian difficulty as
his point of reference, Moyn inaccurately poses an insoluble dilemma
between judicial review and democracy that he then resolves in favor
of democracy and against judicial review. Second, setting aside the
assumption that courts can be agents of structural reform, Moyn
ignores the utility of courts to litigants. His critique of judicial
overreach ignores how litigants use litigation to amplify their
nonjudicial strategies in achieving their goals. The rest of the Article
is organized as follows. Part II briefly examines Moyn's major claims,
especially insofar as they are relevant to this Article's response. Part
III addresses this Article's first major response to Moyn-that his use
of the countermajoritarian difficulty as his point of reference for
critiquing judicial review is a historically contingent US framework
that may not account for how to think about judicial review outside the
United States. In Part IV, this Article shows that Moyn does not
account for the utility that litigants see in courts and the many other
pressure points that these litigants simultaneously engage. It uses
examples from South Africa and the East African Court of Justice to
illustrate this point.

II. MoYN's ARGUMENTS
In his Article, "On Human Rights and Majority Politics: Felix
Frankfurter's Democratic Theory," Samuel Moyn places the
countermajoritarian difficulty at the center of his analysis. 5 He argues
that notwithstanding the warnings of Felix Frankfurter, the "risks of
judicial enforcement of rights" have conquered "the whole world." 6
According to Moyn, the whole world is now in an age of "juristocracy."7
He defines that to mean the tendency "for judges to take responsibility
for expanding and redefining statutory human rights, outrunning

of liberal causes under counter-majoritarian auspices, however effective for a time, has
long since been reversed into reactionary judicial activism.").
5.
See id. at 1140 (arguing that "the Article takes up the countermajoritarian
rights philosopher Ronald Dworkin's critique of Learned Hand-the judge for whom
Dworkin clerked as a young man, not to mention Frankfurter's friend and kindred spirit.
In doing so, the goal is to reflect on the profound change in liberal attitudes towards
rights and democracy that has supervened since Frankfurter struggled for majority rule,
and to suggest that this change now seems a faulty mistake."); see also id. at 1149
(arguing that "it is difficult to quarrel with Frankfurter's worry that countermajoritarian
rights enforcement, like all but the weakest forms of undemocratic intervention, will
expectably lead to the contestable empowerment of the wrong minorities.").
Id. at 1158.
6.
7.
Id.
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popular legitimation and stoking backlash."8 He argues that while this
American export of judicial activism for a time served liberal causes, it
"has long since reversed into reactionary judicial activism, with more
to come."9 For Moyn, the backlash against rights may very well deprive
the people "the opportunity to learn from their mistakes under liberal
democracy before it was too late."' 0 Moyn argues that
Democrats need not turn their backs on rights, but they do need to overcome the
mistake of relying on the princes of law's empire (as Dworkin famously called
judges) and human rights activists (who sometimes assign themselves an
analogous role) as the preeminent guardians of rights. In a democracy, that role
11
falls to the people, ruling themselves.

Moyn warns his reader against the "risks of embracing elite
control on democratic life," particularly how judicial activism could
2
serve as an end run to "popular self-rule."1 For Moyn, activist judicial
review promotes elite rule by human rights lawyers and movements
and their politics, in a way that risks displacing and disempowering
majority preferences or self-rule. 13 Faraway judges, Moyn argues,
appeal to fellow elites who fail to connect with majority interests. 14
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), he argues, have displaced
trade unions and socialist parties, and NGOs, he also charges, have
avoided "party politics and legislative participation . . . in part to

5
convincingly assume the guise of political neutrality."
To avoid these dangers of elite rule, Moyn argues for "principled
arguments for . .. reconciling democracy and rights [in] a more openly
instrumental and strategic approach."1 6 Human rights interests, he
argues,

Id.
8.
9.
Id. at 1158-59.
Id. at 1159.
10.
Id. at 1140. In this respect, Moyn sounds very much like Felix Frankfurter's
11.
majority opinion in Gobitis (the flag salute case) where he argued that "To stigmatize
legislative judgment in providing for this universal gesture of respect for the symbol of
our national life in the setting of the common school as a lawless inroad on that freedom
of conscience which the Constitution protects, would amount to no less than the
pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts possess
no marked and certainly no controlling competence.. . . [T]o the legislature no less than
to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply cherished liberties." Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-98, 600 (1940). Elsewhere, Felix Frankfurter argued
that "it is not the business of [the] Court to pronounce policy [and that] [i]t must observe
a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power [that] precludes [it from] giving effect
to its own notions of what is wise or politic." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Moyn, supranote 1 at 1160.
12.
13.
Id.
14. Id. at 1161.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 1162-63.
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needl] to be reconceptualized in the name of, and therefore as a part of, majority
interests, partly but not only to build coalitions that can win. A vast reorientation
of the human rights enterprise beckons so that, whatever the defensible
autonomy of cause groups, human rights are in the end not a "cause" apart from
democracy but figure within electoral alternative and programmatic debate in
17
the contests for majority support.

He does not, however, develop what he means by a more openly
instrumental and strategic approach--except perhaps his suggestion
that electoral politics is preferable to pursuing judicial solutions.' 8
Another solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty raised by
the use of courts that Moyn argues in favor of, is paying more attention
to international economic law or what he says are examples of
supranational governance interference with self-government. 19 Yet,
Moyn does not give the reader specific examples of the types of
supranational governance interferences with self-government he is
concerned about or he envisages individuals ought to pay more
attention to-nor does he acknowledge the many ways in which human
rights movements around the world challenge supranational economic
governance.20

III. THE UTILITY OF THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY

This Article's central objection to Moyn is his use of the
countermajoritarian difficulty as the central theoretical insight that he
uses to prescribe a global model of judicial review-both for national
and international courts. 2 ' His goal is to persuade the reader to agree
with "Frankfurter's spectacular vision of how to make democratic rule
consistent with human rights."2 2 This Article acknowledges that there
may be legitimate problems with movements that only use courts
rather than democratic institutions to promote their interests. In other
words, this Article's disagreement with Moyn is not that courts on their

17.
Id. at 1164.
18.
Id. at 1154 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter "cast extraordinary doubt on
countermajoritarian enforcement of constitutional rights when majorities were not
prepared to grant them, essentially on the Frankfurterian ground that such action came
inseparably with the tyranny of the minority, and the Thayerian ground that it ruined
democratic learning and vitality. As a result, counter-majoritarian action ought to be
prevented from devolving into Platonic guardianship.").
19.
Id. at 1165.
20.
Id. at 1158 (arguing that the "global tendency has been for judges to take
responsibility for expanding and redefining statutory human rights, often outrunning
popular legitimation and stoking backlash.").
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1142.
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own can enact massive social transformations. 23 Instead, as this
Article will explain further below, Moyn overstates the dangers of
judicial review based on a view of the role of courts closely tied to the
very particular experience of the United States. In addition, his
proposed alternative of relocating political and rights struggles away
from courts to building coalitions that can present electoral
alternatives to win majorities, as superior to the use of courts, 24
fetishizes the utility of majoritarian politics and fails to recognize that
courts could play an important fallback role when majorities run
roughshod over minorities.
The countermajoritarian difficulty is a compelling framework in
the United States, in large part because as adherents of James Bradley
Thayer's theory of judicial restraint like Justice Frankfurter and Moyn
argue, the text of the U.S. Constitution is silent on whether or not
judicial review is available. 25 Following Thayer, skeptics of judicial
review, like Alexander Bickel, have long argued that it was "a deviant
institution in American democracy." 26 For these skeptics of judicial
review, the only way to protect democracy was to prevent laws and
governance from being placed in the hands of judges, who would
employ their whims and personal beliefs.2 7 In this view, judicial review

See Tom Gerald Daly, Author Interview: The Alchemists: Questioning Our
23.
Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders, IACL-AIDC BLOG (Feb. 21, 2018), https:/blogiacl-aidc.org/just-published/2018/5/20/just-published-the-alchemists-questioning-ourfaith-in-courts-as-democracy-builders [https://perma.ccl6SLT-SYJZ] (archived Sept. 3,
2019) (arguing that "we seriously need to re-think the tendency to load courts with an
impossible burden to transform the state and engage in governance. This approach is
undemocratic, in the sense that it diminishes the potential for representative organs of
government and the people to build their own capacity to act within the democratic
system. It is unrealistic, in expecting all courts to be capable of adjudication that
combines high technical quality, political nous, and strategic insight. It is also unfair to
courts themselves, as the higher the expectations we place on them, the more we are
virtually setting them up to fail."); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (raising concerns about the rise of judicial supremacy
reflected in cases like Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) that confirmed Justice
Frankfurter's concerns about the limits of judicial supremacy).
See Moyn, supra note 1 at 1166.
24.
See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
25.
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 131-32 (1893); see also STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB,
UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN

POLITICS 248 (New York Univ. Press 2016) (arguing that the "[c]onstitution says nothing
about restraint. The theory of restraint is based, instead, on the consequences of
activism, on the risks to the [Supreme] Court and to popular constitutionalism."). But
see Geoffrey R. Stone, Selective Judicial Activism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2011)
(arguing that the framers of the U.S. Constitution anticipated judicial review); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the role of courts was to
protect the rights granted to citizens in the Constitution).
26.

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986) (advocating that
the U.S. Supreme Court adopt passive virtues by declining to decide certain cases).
See Thayer, supra note 25, at 138-40.
27.
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was only permissible where legislation was unconstitutional beyond
reasonable doubt.28 This skepticism of judicial review embedded in
Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty in turn "set the terms of the
contemporary debate over judicial review in the United States."2 9 Yet,
as understood today, judicial review is part of the antidemocratic
checks and balances like the electoral college, the Senate, and
staggered terms for senators. 30 In short, judicial review is no more
antimajoritarian than any of these checks and balances.3 1
Moyn's extension of the countermajoritarian difficulty as a
framework for understanding judicial review in the twenty-first
century, especially outside of the United States, assumes this
framework can provide insights anywhere in the world. Yet, the
countermajoritarian difficulty is a historically contingent intellectual
tradition that arose in the very specific context of the United States
and that held center-stage from the late 1930s to 1950s. 32 This
skepticism of judicial review among New Dealers to the Lochner court's
excesses, can, as alluded to above, be traced even further back to the
influential ideas of James Bradley Thayer 3 3 that Felix Frankfurter
endorsed when he arrived as a student at Harvard Law School. 34 Like

28.
See id. at 150-52; see also Sanford Byron Gabin, Judicial Review, James
Bradley Thayer, and the Reasonable Doubt Test, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 1014
(1976). But see Steven G. Calabresi, Originalismand James Bradley Thayer, 113 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1419, 1420-21 (2018) (arguing for the legitimacy of judicial review and its
necessity to allow the court to adapt to an ever-changing world).
29.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 71 (1989) (discussing the acceptance
among constitutional scholars of Bickel's definition of the countermajoritarian
difficulty).
30.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3 (indicating that Senators were originally to be
appointed by their state legislatures).
31.
I thank Barry Sullivan for pointing this out to me. According to Alexander
Hamilton, "The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single
and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to
be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions." THE
FEDERALIST No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Juan F. Perea, Race and
Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1123, 1148 (2012) ("If we ignore the evidence of a proslavery Constitution, we are
not likely to inquire into the important present ramifications of the proslavery
Constitution."); Juan F. Perea, Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery's Legacy Distorts
Democracy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2018) ("One of the proslavery features of
the Constitution is the electoral college, enacted as a way to protect the interests of slave
owners.").
32.
Moyn, supra note 1, at 1144 (arguing that "1943 was as much a landmark
date as 1937 before it, for since that time the traditions of counter-majoritarian
jurisprudence for both liberals and conservative have been robust.").
33.
See generally Thayer, supra note 25, at 130-31 (arguing that the grounds
upon which judges partake in judicial review are insufficient to justify its practice).
34.
See FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARLAN B. PHILIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 299-301 (1960) (noting that Thayer's 1893 essay was "the great guide for
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Thayer, Frankfurter believed in legislators taking their legislative
duties seriously to avoid enacting unconstitutional laws and the public
35
taking their role more seriously in interpreting the Constitution. If
these two prerequisites of a democratic political process that he
believed in were met, then it was not necessary to rely on courts to
invalidate badly drafted legislation.3 6 In short, Frankfurter "believed
that people trumped legislatures, and legislatures trumped courts. He
viewed public opinion and elections, not Supreme Court litigation, as
the surest paths to constitutional change."37
Therefore, to more fully understand the claims of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, it is important to consider the concerns
that catapulted countermajoritarian difficulty as a central concern of
constitutional theorists from many decades ago-and on some accounts
more than a century ago. Understanding what accounted for the rise
of the countermajoritarian difficulty is key to understanding the
preferred vision of judicial review that Moyn advocates.
Further, this Article finds problematic the idea underlying the
countermajoritarian difficulty, 38 that courts and legislatures are

judges and therefore, the great guide for understanding by non-judges of what the place
of the judiciary is in relation to constitutional questions.").
According to Thayer, the "judiciary today, in dealing with acts of their
35.
coordinate legislators, owe to the country no greater or clearer duty than that of keeping
their hands off [their] acts wherever it is possible to do [so]. For that course-the true
course of judicial duty always-will powerfully help to bring the people and their
representatives to a sense of their own responsibility." JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES & FELIx FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL 88 (Philip Kurland ed.,

1967); see also Thayer, supra note 25, at 150 (arguing in favor of legislative supremacy
on the basis that legislatures were the most democratic branch of government).
See Brad Snyder, Frankfurterand Popular Constitutionalism,47 U.C. DAVIS
36.
L. REV. 343, 350, 368 (2013) (arguing that "Frankfurter advocated judicial restraint
because he wanted to reduce reliance on courts to solve the nation's problems and to
increase reliance on the democratic political process. He believed that the democratic
political process was a more enduring, effective, and legitimate method of protecting civil
liberties and producing constitutional change.").
See id. at 366-67.
37.
As Moyn puts it in his paper, "it is certainly the case in law that the people is
38.
empowered to rule itself just as individuals are given rights, so the central matter is who
should decide how to reconcile conflicts between them-majorities themselves, or
someone else." Moyn, supra note 1, at 1143. Moyn tells us that Frankfurter worried that
"the wrong minorities [would] tyrannize majorities." Id. at 1146. In this logic, democracy
loses if courts assert their authority beyond the plain language of the law since the law
on this account embodies majority preferences. One scholar has argued that "[o]ne can
characterize the division between the Frankfurter and the Black/Douglas views in
several ways-restraint versus activism, process versus results, and even Yale versus
Harvard, for both Frankfurter and Douglas started down their respective jurisprudential
paths during the academic stages of their careers." Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure of
Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 175, 186 (1991). Barry Friedman also argued that
the disagreement between two contending schools of thought, "Legal Process and process
theory-also was a struggle between two of the nation's leading legal institutions: Yale
and Harvard. Legal Process and judicial restraint was Harvard's chief position, while
Yale represented Realism, compatible with the activism of the Warren Court." Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counter-majoritarian
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locked up in a zero-sum struggle. This idea presupposes with judicial
review, individuals are presented with two starkly opposed choiceseither to have judicial supremacy under which the courts have the final
word, or to have majoritarian rule. In this account of the
countermajoritarian difficulty advanced by Moyn, courts should not
reverse or nullify laws a current legislative majority produced, because
to do so would contravene the will of such a majority. Moyn argues that
the kind of judicial modesty invited by the countermajoritarian
difficulty should define the role of courts for all time.39 In the next Part,
this Article addresses this objection to Moyn's argument by
emphasizing the historical contingency of the countermajoritarian
difficulty.
A. The HistoricalContingency of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty
This subpart will explain a little more of what is meant by saying
that the countermajoritarian difficulty is a historically contingent
framework. This is important because Moyn's application of this
framework beyond the United States as a "timeless problem grounded
in immutable truths" 40 is at the center of the Article's objections.
Coined by Alexander Bickel, 41 who clerked for Justice Frankfurter on
the Supreme Court, some constitutional theorists in the United States
take the countermajoritarian difficulty as their starting point. 42 By
reviving the relevance of the countermajoritarian difficulty from an era
already past, Moyn bases his argument on why unelected judges
should be constrained. 43 The populist backlash against courts around
the world in the last couple of years of the twenty-first century is the
opening that Moyn capitalizes
on by returning to the
countermajoritarian difficulty and then seeking to globalize it as the

Difficulty, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 231 (2002). In other words, debates about the merits of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty were characterized by debates among an elite group of
elite, white, law professors and judges primarily in the marbled halls of Cambridge, MA
and New Haven, CT. Id.
39.
See Moyn, supra note 1, at 1138.
40.
Friedman, supra note 38, at 156 (arguing that "the countermajoritarian
difficulty that obsesses the legal academy is not some timeless problem grounded in
immutable truths.").
41.
See BICKEL, supra note 26, at 16 (arguing that in our democratic system, the
"root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force" within it).
42.
See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 711 (1995); Paul W. Kahn, Community in
ContemporaryConstitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1989).
43.
See Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation,Character, and Experience,
72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (1992) (arguing that "under the guise of policing the
boundaries between branches and protecting individual freedom, the judges might
advance their own interests-their 'ambitions,' in Madison's terms-and thereby infringe
everyone else's freedom," through judicial activism).
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lens through which to understand the pushback against courts. It is
notable that the contemporary unpopularity of judges in some
countries in this era of populism coincides with hostility towards
judges who were viewed as aristocratic and elitist in the early years of
the United States. 4 5 These populists invoke the power of the electorate
over that of courts. Moyn does not predicate his argument on the rise
of populism, but his claim, like that of Frankfurter, that "legislatures
are [the] ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as the courts," 46 has a striking resonance
with populist critiques of courts. 47
the
that
argues
Article
this
significantly,
More
countermajoritarian difficulty should not become the lens through
which to understand the relationship between democracy and judicial
48
review for the rest of the world for all time, as Moyn argues. For
example, it is not at all clear how the countermajoritarian difficulty as
Moyn advances can be reconciled with the protection of individual and
minority rights from infringement. 4 9 This is particularly important
because for Bickel, whose arguments Moyn closely follows, judicial
50
review cannot be reconciled with majority governance. This Article

44.

For analysis of the populist backlash against courts, see generally WOJCIECH

SADURSKI, POIAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN 1-28 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019);

David Prendergast, The Judicial Role in Protecting Democracy from Populism, 20
GERMAN L.J. 245, 245-62 (2019).
45.

See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELEcTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 86, 96-97

(National Conference of Judicial Councils 1944) (explaining post-colonial aristocracy and
general hostility toward lawyers and judges).
46.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
See generally SADURSEI, supra note 44; Prendergast, supra note 44.
47.
See Croley, supra note 42, at 749 (summarizing three shortcomings of the
48.
countermajoritarian difficulty as follows: "First, legislative outcomes are not
majoritarian-legislative outcomes do not truly manifest majoritarian will-and
consequently judicial review does not upset decisions made by a majority. Alternatively,
judicial review is itself inherently majoritarian, and consequently judicial review does
not upset majoritarian sentiment. Or finally, judicial review is subject to majoritarian
review anyway, and thus there is little point in worrying about whether judicial review
is majoritarian; the majority gets the final say in any case."); see also id. at 749-53
(arguing that there is no good response by adherents of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty to this third shortcoming).
Indeed, as Erwin Chemerinsky has argued, all "judicial review involves
49.
unelected judges invalidating the actions of electorally accountable officials. This means
that attackers of judicial review must either argue for the elimination of all judicial
review or abandon the major premise of their argument [that "all decisions in a
democracy must be subject to control by electorally accountable institutions and
that no theory can reconcile judicial review with majority
individuals"]. I contend ...
rule ... all judicial review is antimajoritarian, so that it is hypocritical and disingenuous
to single out any particular method and criticize it for being antidemocratic. . . ." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 11-12 (Praeger 1987).

According to Bickel, when "the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
50.
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives
of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not [on] behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually
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views this question differently than both Bickel and Moyn. For
example, even though there are many examples of judicial overreach
and populist backlash against courts around the world,5 1 there are also
instances of judicial empowerment as well. 52 Further, political
backlash against courts, including international ones, has not always
been as successful, as has been the case in Poland in the recent past. 53
The reasons why backlash against courts is being witnessed around
the world go well beyond their overreaching in the sense of Bickel's
countermajoritarian difficulty.54 As this Article argues below, while
there are limits to what courts can do to directly achieve social
transformation, courts are an important partner and catalyst when
activists and litigants use them as part of a multidimensional strategy
of seeking change. 55 Filing cases is a particularly important strategy
for litigants and activists who have little power and ability to attain
their objectives through direct political means. 56 Filing a case in court
helps these litigants and activists publicize their cause, galvanize their
supporters, and haul governments before judges so that they can
account for their conduct. 5 7 In short, there is no single story about
judicial review.
By applying this difficulty well beyond its specific United States
origins, Moyn presupposes that it is a lens through which individuals
can understand democratization processes and the role of courts
anywhere, indeed, everywhere-whether the courts are domestic or
international.5 8 This Article will return to the challenges of exporting
the countermajoritarian difficulty in Part III.

happens. It is an altogether different kettle of fish, and it is the reason the charge can be
made that judicial review is undemocratic." BICKEL, supra note 26, at 16-17.
51.
See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash
Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and
Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 293, 293-96, 326-28 (2016) (examining three different
types of outcomes arising from backlash against international courts).
52.
See, e.g., JAMES T. GATHII, THE CONTESTED EMPOWERMENT OF KENYA'S
JUDICIARY 2010-2015: A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (2016) [hereinafter
GATHII, KENYA'S JUDICIARY].

53.
See Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 51.
54.
See BICKEL, supra note 26.
See generally JAMES T. GATHII, REASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA'S
55.
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
(forthcoming
2020)
[hereinafter
GATHII, AFRICA'S
INTERNATIONAL COURTS].

56.
See id.
See id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
57.
courts exist to limit the legislature and the executive as part of the acknowledged
American system of checks and balances in government); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James
Madison) (describing the necessity of checks and balances).
58.
See Moyn, supra note 1, at 1158 (noting that "no one can doubt that the
juristocratic wave of our time has been part of an empowerment of legal elites in a global
project that has reached self-evident limits.").

1248

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:1237

The countermajoritarian difficulty has pitted progressives and
conservatives against each other in the United States for several
decades.59 Conservative judicial activism in the Lochner era in the
1920s and 1930s struck down state and federal laws that regulated
working conditions and minimum wages because the Supreme Court
60
held they violated the freedom to enter into contracts. The Lochner
era court also struck down laws that restricted the freedom to
6
manufacture and the freedom to sell goods and services. 1 For the
Lochner era court, freedom was "the general rule, and restraint the
exception [and] the legislative authority to abridge [could] be justified
only by exceptional circumstances." 62 Progressives have criticized
Lochnerism for its conservative judicial activism in favor of free
markets and limited government.6 3 In the Lochner era, from 1887 to
1937, legislatures were progressive in terms of passing legislation to
64
protect individual rights in the quickly industrializing economy. For
example, legislatures passed legislation to protect the health of
workers from the vagaries of the marketplace by limiting working
65
hours in the newly industrializing country. This legislation limiting
employer decisions was based on human rights grounds. The effect of
this legislation limited the ability of employers to make as much money
as possible. When the Supreme Court struck down these laws, as it did
when it struck down limits on working hours per day in Lochner, it was
arguably blocking progressive reform. 66

See id. at 1141 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner to allow
59.
the "inherent rights belonging to everyone" to trump those of the legislative majority
resonated for decades); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (holding that "[s]tatutes ... limiting the hours in
60.
which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome
interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved from
condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the police power and
upon the subject of the health of the individual whose rights are interfered with, unless
there be some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is material danger
to the public health or to the health of the employees, if the hours of labor are not
curtailed.").
See Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administrationand the Law of the Lochner Era,
61.
107 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1325-26 (2019) (discussing the Lochner-era court's anti-free market
decisions and the economic ramifications of those cases).
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534
62.
(1923) (holding that "while there is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract and it
is subject to a variety of restraints, they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable.").
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874-75
63.
(1987) (arguing that Lochner's primary problem was that the Supreme Court treated the
market ordering under the common law as "natural" rather than a legal construct.
Proceeding from that premise, the Supreme Court treated any governmental action
departing from the common law baseline as "unnatural" and therefore illegitimate).
The Lochner-era came to an end with the Supreme Court's decision in West
64.
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning an earlier Lochner-eracase,
Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
Sohoni, supra note 61, at 1330.
65.
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66.
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The Warren court from the early 1950s to the early 1970s by
contrast engaged in liberal judicial activism. 67 The Warren court
protected the interests of historically underrepresented minorities,
such as African Americans, dissenters, women, and persons accused of
crimes, who were disregarded by the governing majority. 68 It also used
its authority to limit governing majorities to perpetuate political
power, entrench the status quo, or stifle its critics. 69
As one commentator noted in the heyday of the Warren court,
"[a]ccusations of too-much-Court-power ... reversed polarity ... in the
[1930s] it was the liberals who cursed the court for killing progressive
legislation .

.

. Today it is, by and large, conservative elements who

accuse the Court of usurping power and upsetting the federal
balance."70
Another shift, towards conservative judicial activism, began in the
early 1990s after a series of appointments of conservative justices. 7 1

67.
See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court And The Pursuit Of Justice, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 5, 9 (1993) (arguing that the Warren Court was characterized by
inaugurating two ideals-that idea of a living constitution that justified decisions like
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., and a rights revolution. Horowitz argued that the Warren Couirt
"revived the revolutionary spirit of rights discourse after it had been debased in the
protection of slavery and, arguably, in the protection of property. But the rights idea was
an eighteenth century newtonian idea. A static conception of self-evident truths,
endowed by a creator as inalienable, as there for all time, as unchanging. The living
constitution idea, by contrast, regarded constitutions as changing and changeable
depending on the circumstances. Both of these ideas coexisted in the Warren Court and
they continue to coexist uncomfortably today.").
68.
See id. (arguing that "[t]he Warren Court was the first Court in American
history that really identified with those who are down and out-the people who received
the raw deal, those who are the outsiders, the marginal, the stigmatized. It was the first
sympathetic treatment that blacks received from the Supreme Court, with the arguable
exception of the decade after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
Moreover, not only blacks but other minorities-religious minorities, political
dissenters, illegitimates, poor people, prisoners and accused criminals received
sympathetic treatment.").
69.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(noting that "there may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation . . . 'discriminates against discrete and insular
minorities' in circumstances in which it is reasonable to infer that prejudice, intolerance,
or indifference might seriously have curtailed 'the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."'); see also Stone, supra note 25, at
1424.
70.
Fred Rodell, Warren Court Stands Its Ground, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 27,
1964, at 120-21.
71.
See Stone, supra note 25, at 1427-28 (noting that "[b]y 1993, after twelve
consecutive Republican appointments, the average voting record of the five most
conservative Justices (Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy) was .798,
and the swing Justice, Anthony Kennedy, had a voting record of .695. Thus, the Court
majority was roughly as conservative in 1993 as it had been liberal in 1968. Even more
striking, by 1993 the 'liberals' on the Court were almost as conservative as the
'conservatives' on the Court in 1968.").
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Under the control of these conservative appointees, the Supreme Court
held as unconstitutional
affirmative action programs, gun control regulations, limitations on the
authority of corporations to spend at will in the political process, restrictions on
commercial advertising, laws prohibiting groups like the Boy Scouts from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, federal legislation regulating
guns, age discrimination, the environment, and violence against women, and
policies of the State of Florida relating to the outcome of the 2000 presidential
election.

72

Some scholars have begun to piece together how President Trump's
blueprint for government resonates with some of the core themes and
values of Lochner era jurisprudence. 73 Moyn interprets the
conservative agenda to put a fifth reliably conservative justice on the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2018 as having been prompted by the desire of
74
liberals to use courts to push through their agenda. Quite clearly,
Moyn's analysis throughout the paper is primarily built on the
75
experience of the United States.
It is difficult to transpose this specific history largely predicated
on the propriety of judicial review in the United States beyond its
borders as a lens for understanding the proper role of courts
everywhere. It is quite clear, at least in the United States, when
conservatives engaged in judicial activism, progressives cried foul and
vice versa.7 6 Further, this Article is not persuaded by Moyn's argument
that Felix Frankfurter's judicial modesty offers an alternative vision to
conservative and liberal judicial activism. What is clear though, is that
Moyn has provocatively invited the reader to critically evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of activist judicial review, whether liberal
or conservative, and to consider whether there are alternatives
between these two polar options that he presents. Part III considers
those alternatives.

&

Stone, supra note 25, at 1429 (discussing the "unmistakably activist
72.
decisions" of the conservative Justices of the 1990s).
See, e.g., Sohoni, supra note 61, at 1358-59 (Lochner-eramotifs in the Trump
73.
administration include: curtailment of the individual mandate in Obama care; shielding
employers from providing insurance coverage for contraception; expanding options for
school choice; shielding domestic workers from foreign competition; and crackdowns on
immigrants including for accessing public resources).
See Moyn, supra note 1, at 1140.
74.
75.
See id.
See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW
76.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149-50 (2004) ("When the ideological valence of Supreme Court
decisions shifts, constitutional theorizing about judicial review tends to shift as well.
Over the last century or more there have been two general positions taken about judicial
review: that it is a blight in a democratic system that must be curtailed, and that it is a
valued part of U.S. government essential to the protection of constitutional
liberty.. .Progressives at the turn of the twenty-first century are echoing criticisms
offered by progressives one hundred years earlier, though progressives took a more
positive position toward judicial review during the Warren Court.").
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B. JudicialRestraint/Modesty as JudicialAbdication
From this Article's vantage point, the vision of judicial modesty
that Moyn argues in favor of amounts to judicial abdication to enforce
rights in practice. The limitations of this restrainist approach to
judicial review in favor of enforcing rights was captured by Justice
Robert Jackson's majority decision in Barnette, a decision that
overturned that court's Gobitis decision, where he argued that
[The] very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's rights to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
77
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

This view of the role of the court stands at odds with Justice Felix
Frankfurter's view of keeping courts away from politics that underlay
his Gobitis decision. This alternative view, in which courts have a role
to protect rights under certain circumstances, is also associated with
Justice Stone's lone dissent in Gobitis as it is with Carolene Products
footnote 4. 78 In Gobitis, Jehovah's Witness school children were
expelled for refusing to salute the American flag.79 They argued that
saluting the flag was inconsistent with their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.o80 Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Frankfurter
argued that the Supreme Court could not substitute itself for the school
district that had expelled the school children. si According to

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see Rebecca
77.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 570 (1998)
(arguing that the view of democracy embodied in the U.S. Constitution is one in which
"the people did not establish primarily a utility-maximizing constitution, but rather a
tyranny-minimizing role.").
See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601-04 (1940) (Stone, J.,
78.
dissenting) ("[T]he state seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which ...
violates their deepest religious convictions. The very essence of the liberty . . . is the
freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall
say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion."); United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that the presumption of
constitutionality may be narrower "when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution"); see also Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote
Four:A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 176-79 (2004)
(noting that CaroleneProducts footnote four can be seen as an effort to protect minority
groups from failures in the pluralistic process).
79.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 at 591.
80.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 598 (arguing that to "so hold would, in effect, make us the school board
81.
for the country. That authority has not been given to this Court, nor should we assume
it.").
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Frankfurter, the school district's requirement that school children
salute the flag was justified as a means of promoting national unity. 82
As already noted in Part I above, Frankfurter makes a fair point
about why courts should not substitute themselves for legislatures.
The problem posed by Justice Frankfurter's adherence to his vision of
judicial modesty is that it presupposes that judicial review rests on
making a choice between the role of courts in protecting rights in the
Carolene Products footnote 4 tradition, on the one hand, versus the
countermajoritarian dilemma on the other hand.8 3 Yet, perhaps it is
best to think of the stakes as a choice between the positive and negative
sides of the Carolene Products footnote 4 tradition and the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Seen this way, judicial review is a
question about which of these choices to make and when to make them.
From that vantage point, while Frankfurter's judicial modesty and
Bickel's passive virtues including prudential thinking were right on
point, they failed to take into account when and if courts should
intervene. They did not contemplate situations in which judicial action
overruling legislative decisions may have been necessary. 84 Ronald
Dworkin made this point when he argued that the
constitutional theory on which our government rests is not a simple majoritarian
theory. The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to
protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a majority
of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes to
85
be the general or common interest.

To illustrate when it would be appropriate for courts to reverse
legislative judgments in a way that would be impermissible under
Frankfurter's vision of judicial modesty, this Article examines the
Barnette decision that raised the same issue as Gobitis a few years

82.
See id. at 600 (holding that the US government may use the education system
to instill American values despite conflicts with religious beliefs).
For an example of an argument in favor of courts actively protecting rights
83.
inconsistently with many of the adherents of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, see
Alpheus Mason,

THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 171-78 (Univ. of

Michigan Press 1962).
I thank Stephen Gottlieb for these insights and for pointing me to James
84.
Wilson at the 1787 Constitutional Convention on July 21, 1787 who argued that "Laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect." James Wilson,
Penn. Delegate Constitutional Convention of 1787 (July 21, 1787). That phrase "so
unconstitutional" suggests judgment and discretion. Wilson was one of the first members
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. This quote suggests that courts have discretion to decide
when to overturn or not to overturn legislative judgments for unconstitutionality in a
way that the counter-majoritarian commitments of Bickel and Frankfurter did not.
85.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-33 (Harv. Univ. Press

1977); see also Snyder, supra note 36, at 414-15 (arguing that Frankfurter preferred to
rely on popular, democratic processes to protect the civil liberties and rights of all
citizens, and so relied on judicial modesty to prevent courts from protecting or creating
rights that would be better protected in the long term by the legislative branch).
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earlier. Public opinion supported the expulsion of Jehovah's Witness
children and the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses after the Gobitis
opinion in part because the public misunderstood Gobitis to have
decided that Jehovah's Witnesses were traitors.8 6 By the time that
Justice Robert Jackson was appointed to the court, some of the justices
had already acknowledged in memoranda accompanying cases brought
by Jehovah's Witnesses that they were wrong to have decided against
the Witnesses in Gobitis. 87 However, Felix Frankfurter remained
unpersuaded that the court could come to the aid of the Witnesses, a
persecuted religious minority.8 8 Thus, although both Justice Jackson
and Justice Frankfurter developed their views on the role of courts in
an era when progressives were critical of the conservative judicial
activism of the Lochner era, they had different views about the role of
courts particularly in a time of war or national emergency. It is,
therefore, perhaps best to understand Frankfurter's views as a justice
of the Supreme Court on the basis that he "relied far more heavily upon
arguments grounded in respect for minority viewpoints and states'
rights than in countermajoritarian criticism."8 9
Learned Hand, another friend of Frankfurter, who served on the
Second Circuit, exemplifies how judicial restraint translates into
judicial abstention. For Learned Hand, Brown v. Board of Education,
or the segregation cases as he referred to Brown and its companion
cases, was an example of how the Supreme Court reversed the
"legislative judgment" of the states "by its own appraisal" of the values
at stake.9 0 Hand argued against the legal fundamentalism adopted by
the Supreme Court in the Lochner era that treated the Bill of Rights
as "real legal prohibitions." 9 1 To overcome this fundamentalism, Hand
argued that the directions of the Bill of Rights should be understood as
admonitions to forbearance. 9 2

86.
See Shawn Frances Peters, Prelude to Barnette: The Jehovah's Witnesses and
the Supreme Court, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 758, 762 (2007) (noting that US citizens
thought the Supreme Court had labeled Jehovah's Witnesses as traitors).
87.
See id. at 763-64.
88.
See id.; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 664-65
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89.
Friedman, supra note 38, at 175.
90.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LECTURES, 54 (Harv. Univ. Press 1958).
91.
Id.
92.
See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 263 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (noting that Hand
believed he could only check legal fundamentalism by undermining "the law-like
character of constitutional prohibitions.").
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Herbert Wechsler, another judicial restrainist, argued that Brown
could not be explained on neutral principles.9 3 According to Wechsler,
"Given a situation where the state must practically choose between
denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it
on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for
holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association
should prevail?" 94
Now consider this approach to judicial review for a further
moment. Would the United States really be in a better place if
Frankfurter's theory of judicial restraint had prevailed, and he had
been able to carry the court with him in Brown on that theory? If Moyn
can answer that question convincingly, then his endorsement of
Frankfurter's approach to judicial review particularly on matters
relating to human rights would be more persuasive.
There is further reason to be skeptical of Frankfurter's view of
judicial restraint. From its vantage point, it meant that in Gobitis,
Frankfurter argued that religious convictions could not be protected
when they conflicted with national unity. 9 In his words, it was
"essential to secure and maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free
society without which religious toleration itself is unattainable." 96
National unity for Frankfurter was the most important value at stake
in Gobitis and, as such, the freedom of speech under which the Gobitis
97
children sought protection for their religious beliefs was secondary.
98
Again, it is best to cite Frankfurter here. According to him,
[t]o stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this universal gesture of
respect for the symbol of our national life in the setting of the common school as
a lawless inroad on that freedom of conscience which the Constitution protects,
would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and
psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no
controlling competence.

99

Felix Frankfurter had not changed his view of the role of the court
when the same issue arose in the Barnette case a few years after the
Gobitis decision. In his lone dissent in Barnette, he argued that "this
Court's only and very narrow function is to determine whether within

93.

See HERBERT WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,

in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL

LAW 3, 47 (Hary. Univ. Press 1961)

(acknowledging that Wechsler had yet to reconcile denying association to one group of
individuals and forcing association on another group of individuals).
Id.
94.
See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (stating that
95.
society should be able to use the educational system to foster patriotism, regardless of
"lesser differences and difficulties").
Id.
96.
See id. (holding that educational institutions could compel students to salute
97.
the American flag).
Id. at 598-99.
98.
Id.
99.
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the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have exercised
a judgment for which reasonable justification can be offered."1 00
Frankfurter's Gobitis opinion and Barnette dissent put too much
faith in the democratic process. They failed to recognize, and indeed
resisted embracing judicial review to protect the individual liberties of
minority groups at a time when other justices were doing so.101 Moyn
urges the reader of his Article to overlook the reasons why Frankfurter
lost the majority on the court. 102 Yet, the reasons for Frankfurter's
reluctance to recognize the abandonment of judicial restraint on
individual liberties on the court is relevant for assessing why he lost
the majority on the court in Gobitis and related cases in which the court
was invited to review legislative choices argued to be in conflict with
certain rights.
Ultimately, the question that Felix Frankfurter's commitment to
judicial restraint raises is why he voted to end school segregation in
Brown. This is a fair question because he firmly believed that courts
should not interfere with majority decisions reflected in legislative
mandates upon which school segregation was established in states like
Kansas. 0 3 I will to return to this point below. This judicial modesty
was also at play in Frankfurter's opinions in reapportionment cases.104

100. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649 (1943) (showing that
Frankfurter's commitment to judicial restraint with regard to individual rights as the
proper role for courts came from his admiration of Justices like Holmes who had adopted
it in their own time on the Court).
101. See Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failureof Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. RICH. L. REV.
195, 195 (1991) (arguing that "the tragedy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was that he became
a prisoner of an idea-judicial restraint-and failed to distinguish between the
regulation of economic and property rights and limitations upon individual liberties");
see also Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Felix Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 496, 508 (1976) (arguing that Frankfurter did also protect civil liberties). But see
Snyder, supra note 36, at 380 (citations omitted) (arguing that in this same period,
Frankfurter voted "to uphold the criminal convictions of Communists and the
constitutionality of the Smith Act in Dennis and to revoke the citizenship of a Communist
in Schneiderman. He displayed a willingness to balance away their rights because of his
belief in departmentalism and the broad scope of congressional and executive power.").
102. Moyn, supra note 1, at 1142.
103. See Barry Sullivan, Democratic Conditions, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming
2019) ("Sometimes the voting cases, the malapportionment cases in particular, are
praised on the ground that they took care of a problem that legislatures had refused to
do anything about. That is true, but it is a dangerously incomplete account. There are
many things legislatures 'haven't done anything about' that should be left in precisely
that condition. A more complete account of the voting cases is that they involve rights
(1) that are essential to the democratic process and (2) whose dimensions cannot safely
be left to our elected representatives, who have an obviously vested interest in the status
quo.") (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 117 (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1980)).
104. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that the Court
should not declare provisions of Illinois law governing Congressional districts because
establishing Congressional districts is a political activity).
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Thus, in Colegrove v. Green, 05 he argued that the Supreme Court did
not have jurisdiction over "political cases," because to do so was to enter
into a "political thicket." 106
When the Supreme Court overruled Colegrove in Baker v. Carr,
Frankfurter dissented, arguing as he did in Colegrove1 07 that the
Supreme Court had, by accepting jurisdiction, decided that it was now
in the business of devising "what should constitute the proper
composition of the legislatures of the fifty States."1 0 8 As Frankfurter
argued in Colegrove, "[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve
the judiciary in the politics of the people." 0 9 This view exemplifies how
far Frankfurter was willing to advance his commitment to the
democratic process when courts were invited to decide cases he
believed belonged to the legislature. 110 His prediction that, by taking
this case, a judicial nightmare that would be difficult for the court to
emerge from would occur,"' did not materialize. In Baker, he argued
that "[f]rom its earliest opinions this Court has consistently recognized
a class of controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial
standards and judicial remedies."1 1 2 Notwithstanding Frankfurter's
concerns that it would result in a nightmare, Baker had "broad
approval by the American public." 11 3 The public popularity of the
reapportionment cases undermined the view of those committed to the
fixed view of the countermajoritarian difficulty to the effect that
"legislative bodies were reflecting popular will, and that courts were
not."114
From this perspective, Frankfurter's judicial restraint in
reapportionment cases, therefore, amounted to judicial abdication. By
abstaining from interfering with legislative choices, he was in effect
deciding for the party that had somehow already won in the legislature.
His failure to see courts as having a role to play in protecting rights,
even in such clear cases where minority voters had been
disenfranchised, was, even if only in retrospect, a failure of his vision
for the role of a court as a guardian of the Constitution, a role some of

105. See id.
106. Id. at 556.
107. See id. at 553.
108. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553.
110. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 297 (arguing that Baker v. Carr was not an equal
protection case, but rather like Colegrove v. Green "a Guarantee Clause claim
masquerading under a different label.").
111. Urofsky, supra note 101, at 207 (arguing that Frankfurter's "prophecies of a
judicial nightmare [in Baker v Carr] never materialized, and although the entrenched
state legislators fought to prevent reapportionment, once it happened and a majority
population controlled a majority of legislative seats, all opposition ceased.").
112. Baker, 369 U.S. at 280 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. Friedman, supra note 40, at 206.
114. Id. at 221.
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the framers had anticipated.11 5 Frankfurter did indeed acknowledge
that his views were those of "an old-fashioned liberal's view of
government and law." 116 He had real difficulties in declaring
segregation unconstitutional. 117 Should individuals in the twenty-first
century adopt the views of such a self-styled, old-fashioned liberal for
the whole world? In other words, should judicial review be "conditional
on the public's willingness to accept"" 8 what courts rule?x"9
To reflect on Frankfurter's concerns about the risks of judicial
review, it is worthwhile to briefly contemplate the stakes involved. Was
Frankfurter, like Bickel, concerned that getting the public's
willingness to obey the Supreme Court's desegregation decree required
judicial modesty? It seems that he had difficulty believing that
segregation in public schools in Brown was constitutional and the only
way he could conclude as a policy matter that segregation was
unacceptable is if there was a unanimous decision of the court. Another
way to read his difficulty, is to assume that he believed to put life in
the Brown decision, the court needed unanimity so that it could be seen
to have decisively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson. Yet, one has to wonder
whether Frankfurter's concerns about original intent that arguably
put Brown off for reargument for a year were motivated by his

115. See Stone, supra note 25, at 1429; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things,
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority . . . . This independence
of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals
from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate
reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.");
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (describing overreaching legislatures,
interfering with the proper function of the judiciary and to trample on minority rights).
116. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 217, 237 (1955).
117. JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, A STORM OVER THIS COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING IN BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 82-83 (Univ. of
Virginia Press 2013).
118. Id. at 60.
119. See id. at 64, 76. (reporting that "Justice William Douglas recorded
Frankfurter as stating that 'he has read all of [the] history [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] and he can't say it meant to abolish segregation.' In conclusion,
Frankfurter asked, 'What justifies us in saying that what was equal in 1868 is not equal
now[?]' He confessed that he could not say that 'this Court has long misread the
Const[itution]' in permitting segregation, that 'it's unconstitutional to treat a negro
differently than a white.' Unlike Reed, however, he did not suggest that he would vote
to sustain the constitutionality of segregation. Instead, he found it'highly desirable'that
the Court 'put all [of] the cases down for reargument."'). Notably, Frankfurter relied on
a memo from his clerk, Alexander Bickel to the effect that the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment was inclusive outlawed segregation.
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prudence of making sure that the court's decision accorded to majority
will. 12 0 Did Frankfurter fear that without unanimity in Brown, the

country would be roiled in unfortunate turmoil, a fear he had expressed
in Baker v. Carr as we saw above? From the vantage point of this
Article, these are not the types of prudential concerns that judges
should take into account in deciding issues on which there are deep
political divisions, particularly where rights of disenfranchised
minorities are at stake.
In short, Moyn seems to be inviting us to adopt Justice
Frankfurter's judicial posture when courts are invited to decide cases
that are politically divisive and highly contested. If that is so, Moyn
seems to be suggesting that we should remember Frankfurter for
advocating for a court order in Brown that would not have required a
drastic and instant end to segregation, as reflected by Frankfurter's
very determined efforts to reconcile his views of the role of the court
with the primary issue in question in Brown.121 Or perhaps Moyn is
saying that we should identify with Frankfurter's unease at coming to
a quick conclusion "on a legal issue [that] was inextricably bound up
22
with deep feeling on sharply conflicting social and political issues"?1
Ultimately, framing the role of the courts as a choice between
respect for legislative majorities and judicial activism that upsets
23
legislative majorities, as Moyn endorsing Frankfurter does,1 misses
a more basic question: Under what circumstances is judicial review
warranted? In the election area, where politicians have high incentives
to distort the process in their favor and against others, respect for
legislative majorities entrenches such distortions. Such distortions
have negative consequences on minorities when courts fail to overturn
legislative choices that entrench majorities.1 24 Therefore, it mattered

120. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:Decisionmakingin
the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 35-41 (1979) (identifying competing
explanations why the Brown opinion was put off by a year in addition to Frankfurter's
desire for unanimity and clarification of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These reasons included the fact that Chief Justice Vinson died before the Court had
reached a conclusion in the case).
121. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 602 (2004) (noting that

Frankfurter's desire for an order than was not drastic, instant and universal).
122. Id. at 686.
123. See HART ELY, supra note 103, at 4, 135 (trying to reconcile the two when he
argues that the Supreme Court can assure majority governance while protecting
minority rights); see also Snyder, supra note 36, at 368 (noting that, by contrast,
Frankfurter "was uncomfortable with the Court initiating social or political change and
preferred that the Court follow or act in concert with the executive or legislative
branches.").
124. See generally Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a
provision in the Voting Rights Act that forced counties to obtain preclearance to change
voting procedures because the formula Congress uses to determine which counties
required preclearance is based on 40-year-old facts and Congress did not update the
formula when it extended the Act in 2006).
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for disenfranchised minorities when the Supreme Court beat back
malapportionment and other election manipulation from about 1937 to
2013, until the Roberts court decided it had no role to play in
supervising partisan gerrymandering claims, even when those seeking
relief were disenfranchised racial minorities. 125
It is plausible to argue that Frankfurter underestimated the role
of the Supreme Court as a guardian of civil liberties by foregrounding
what he called the "explosive psychological and political attitudes" that
the Brown case raised.1 26 Contrary to such skepticism of the role of
courts as guardians of civil liberties, the declaration of segregated
schools in Brown as unconstitutional fueled the momentum for
desegregation in travel, employment, and housing, achieved through
the courts and Congress as well. 127 The Brown decision laid the
groundwork for challenging desegregation in public accommodations
like waiting rooms, pools, and beaches, which were not equally funded
or maintained as those used by whites.1 2 8 It helped lead to legislation,
such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.129
As Mark Graber has argued, "the American experience with
mandatory flag salutes and segregation illustrates [that] the Supreme
Court tends to nationalize issues, forcing local proponents of restrictive
policies to forge broader, more national, majorities in order to make

125. See id. (holding a provision of the Voting Rights Act that required certain
states and counties to obtain preclearance from federal authorities before changing
voting procedures unconstitutional); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the
DiscriminationModel on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100 (2013) ("Shelby County thus
closes the chapter on the most important and most successful of the civil rights laws from
the 1960s); GOTTLIEB, supra note 25, at 202 (arguing that with Shelby, the Supreme
Court has "largely closed the legal chapter of the civil rights movement with respect to
minorities"). See generally Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional
Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351 (2017); Justin Levitt,
Intent Is Enough: Invidious Partisanshipin Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993
(2018); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2018); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer,
JudicialIntervention as JudicialRestraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236 (2018).
126. See KLUGER, supra note 121, at 687 (noting that Frankfurter struggled with
the political and sociological aspects of segregation cases). But see Michael Klarman,
How Brown Changed Race Relations, The Blacklash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 85-91
(1994) (expressing skepticism about the direct impact of the Brown decision).
127. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47
How. L.J. 499, 514-18 (2004) (highlighting the importance of mobilizing the AfricanAmerican community, especially Black lawyers in the fight against segregation in all
areas).
128. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1526-28 (2005) (noting that racial isolation is harmful
even in affluent black communities).
129. See id. at 1519-21 (arguing that Brown must have stigmatized desegregation
at large if Congress is passing laws against it).
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their constitutional vision the law of the land." 130 Frankfurter's
opinion in Gobitis and his dissent in Barnette sought to nationalize as
the law of the land the restrictions imposed by state legislatures
punishing students who failed to salute the flag, notwithstanding their
well-held religious conviction that to do so was heretical. Moyn's
sweeping endorsement of Frankfurter's judicial modesty similarly fails
to contemplate a role for the courts in protecting civil liberties. For
Frankfurter to protect the Jehovah's Witness children in Gobitis would
13 1
Barnette, for
have constituted a form of "deviant" judicial review.
Frankfurter, was therefore exactly the kind of deviant judicial review
he disapproved. Like those committed to the countermajoritarian
difficulty, such as Alexander Bickel, Frankfurter made "exaggerated
and ultimately unconvincing" arguments about the undemocratic
132
nature of judicial review.
difficulty
of the countermajoritarian
Finally, adherents
sometimes "fail to recognize that much of what constitutional courts do
is invalidate the work of administrative or police officials, whose
1 33
decisions can only dubiously be called 'majoritarian."'

IV. DOES THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY HELP US
UNDERSTAND JUDICIAL REVIEW OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES?
Moyn's Article uses the countermajoritarian difficulty beyond the
United States in his brief review of national courts in other
jurisdictions and of some international courts.134 By globalizing the
countermajoritarian difficulty, Moyn exports one of its central and very
problematic assumptions: that since representative bodies are
democratically elected, they are legitimate, and further judicial review
13 5
As is clear
of the laws enacted by such bodies is countermajoritarian.
from the earlier part of this Article, the countermajoritarian difficulty
is a historically contingent United States intellectual tradition. Even
taking into account the features such as the electoral college, the

130. Mark A. Graber, False Modesty: Felix Frankfurter and the Tradition of
JudicialRestraint, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 32 (2007).
131. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 18.
132. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-RealistConstitution,
11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 537 (1976) (noting that Bickel conceded "that American
government was not 'majoritarian"').
133. Friedman, supra note 40, at 175.
134. See generally Moyn, supra note 1, at 1139-40 (arguing that human rights
advocates should pursue majoritarian strategies rather than countermajoritarian ones).
135. I will bracket for the moment whether or not the counter-majoritarian
difficulty accurately describes the nature of democracy in the United States. This is
highly contested among constitutional theorists. See GoTTLIEB, supra note 25, at 23861 for a persuasive account of how democracy is part of the U.S. Constitution and of
American values and that it should have a large place in American law that is not based
on a counter-majoritarian understanding.
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Senate, and staggered terms for senators, it becomes quite clear that
the countermajoritarian difficulty is an incomplete account of how
democratic institutions in the United States are designed. 136 Some of
these institutions, such as the electoral college, the Senate, and their
staggered terms, were designed to be countermajoritarian.13 7 Moyn
does not acknowledge these countermajoritarian features. He also says
little about the limitations of the countermajoritarian framework and
some of the criticisms leveled against it that has led generations of
scholars since then to free themselves from its "rhetorical grasp."13 8 In
particular, the countermajoritarian difficulty is "court obsessed." 3 9 As
Barry Friedman further argues, the countermajoritarian difficulty is
often a jumping-off point for constitutional theorists "to justify presentday political preferences in light of an inherited intellectual
tradition."1 40
In much of the rest of the world, there has been no fixation in
academic debates or judicial opinions over judicial activism and
restraint in the same way that there has been in the United States now
for close a century.141 Indeed, as Tom Ginsburg has argued, scholars of
American constitutionalism focus "almost exclusively on normative
issues of judicial legitimacy rather than positive issues of judicial
power." 142 In his view issues of judicial legitimacy "may be less
important in contexts where there is a clear constitutional moment and

136. Walter Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3,
17-19 (Doug Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (noting that the authority to interpret the U.S.
Constitution is shared among the branches of government).
137. PATRICE HIGONNET, SISTER REPUBLICS: THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH AND
AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 85-90 (Harv. Univ. Press 1988) (noting that in Federalist
Paper No. 62, James Madison argued that the staggered terms of the Senate were
intended to achieve national stability and international respectability).
138. See Friedman, supra note 40, at 156-57 (citing academics who argue that as
an empirical matter judicial review does not generally trump majoritarian preferences
and that courts are more likely to declare legislation unconstitutional when the
dominant national coalition is unwilling or unable to settle some public dispute); Mark
A. Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 45-61 (1993) (exploring three instances in which the model
posed by the countermajoritarian difficulty did not offer adequate insight into judicial
decision-making).
139. See Friedman, supra note 40, at 158.
140. Id. at 158; see also Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014 (1984) (arguing that "[t]he countermajoritarian
difficulty proclaimed in The Least Dangerous Branch achieved its ascendancy over the
modern legal mind by expressing an opinion that, after two full generations, had become
the prevailing wisdom in both scholarly reflection and legal practice.").
141. See Ayse Zarakol, Is JudicializationGood for Democracy? A Comparative
Discussion, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION
77 (Giorgi Areshidze et al. eds., 2016).
142. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 16 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2003).
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43
a designated court whose only role is to safeguard the constitution."1
Rather than focusing on issues of judicial legitimacy, such as those tied
to the countermajoritarian difficulty, examples outside the United
States prompt individuals to think about why politicians and
144
This is an
constitution makers seek judicial review in the first place.
important question because as Moyn following Frankfurter and scores
14 5
In other
of scholars have argued-judicial review is undemocratic.
words, if individuals only focused on the supply but not demand side of
judicial review, such a focus may reveal dimensions of judicial review
that are not visible given the almost exclusive focus of American
constitutionalism on normative issues of judicial review centered
around unending and insoluble debates of the countermajoritarian

difficulty. 146

This Article's view is that individuals should dethrone, or at least
radically temper down, the countermajoritarian difficulty as the point
of reference for understanding the role of national and international
courts outside the United States, and particularly those in developing
countries1 47 One advantage of abandoning this framework is that it
gets rid of the "insoluble tension" 48 embodied in the zero-sum choice
between judicial restraint and judicial activism. More importantly, the
countermajoritarian difficulty is premised on denying legitimacy to
judicial review in a democratic system. Understanding judicial review,
especially in newly democratizing countries, ought not to begin on the
basis of assumptions that question its very legitimacy. In addition,
courts operating outside the United States have their own distinctive
legal and political contexts that uniquely account for the type of
judicial review they exercise.1 49 In short, it is foolhardy to always view

143.

Id.

144. See id. at 15-19 (noting that the United States may not be a proper
benchmark for analyzing judicial review and arguing that one is likely to see more active
judicial review in countries with more diffused politics, and much less so in countries
where a dominant disciplined political party holds power).
145. Id. at 16; Moyn, supra note 1, at 1151.
146. See Ackerman, supra note 140, at 1016 ("Increasingly dissatisfied with his
effort to rationalize judicial review in The Least DangerousBranch, Bickel's search was
cut short by premature death before he could find an answer with which he might rest
content. And in the decade since his death, we have been inundated with new answers
to Bickel's question. Hardly a year goes by without some learned professor announcing
that he has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, or, even
more darkly, that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.").
147. See KAREN ALTER & LARRY HELFER, TRANSPLANTING INTERNATIONAL
COURTS: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE ANDEAN TRIBUNAL OF JUSTICE 274 (Ruth

Mackenzie ed., 2017) (noting that non-European international courts "deploy strategies
that diverge from those of the European tribunals in response to the distinctive legal and
political contexts that these emerging courts face.").
148. See Friedman, supra note 40, at 247 (noting that mid-century scholars
supported the Warren Court's results but were critical of its methods).
149. See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 149-53 (1998) (making the case for the unique role of judges in
South Africa after the end of apartheid is to 'promote and fulfill' through one's
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the countermajoritarian difficulty that has characterized how judicial
review is understood in the United States for more than a century as
the lens through which to study judicial review everywhere in the
world in the twenty-first century. 150 This is particularly important
given that the concerns of the countermajoritarian difficulty today
coincide with the policies driving the populist backlash against judicial
review around the world. 151 This Article's criticism of the
countermajoritarian difficulty recognizes the institutional limits of
courts as social engineers for achieving large-scale social change. A
major argument made in this Article is that the countermajoritarian
difficulty overestimates the illegitimacy of judicial review in a
democracy.
This Article will use the example of South Africa and the East
African Court of Justice to illustrate the foregoing claims.

professional work the 'democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom,' and
to work to 'establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights."' He further argues that that vision of judicial review is justified by the
"South African Constitution, in sharp contrast to the classical liberal documents, is
social, redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly horizontal, participatory,
multicultural, and self-conscious about its historical setting and transformative role and
mission.").
150.

See GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 55 (manuscript at

Introduction) (arguing that compliance and effectiveness should be the sole basis that
scholars should use to assess the performance of Africa's international courts).
151. See, e.g., SADURSKI, supra note 44, at 19.
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In South Africa1 52 (and Kenya as well), 153 unlike in the United
54
States, judicial review is expressly provided for in the Constitution.1
As a result, the legitimacy of judicial review takes a completely
different posture from that of the contemporary United States. 155 The
text of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly recognize judicial
review in the same way the South African and Kenyan constitutions
do. 156 Thus, the question of the legitimacy of judicial review does not
arise in the same way it has in light of the countermajoritarian

152. S. AFR. CONST., 1996. Article 8(3) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa
provides that when "in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, [a court] must apply, or
if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect
to that right; and . . . may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1)." Article 38 provides that
individuals have "the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate
relief, including a declaration of rights." Article 39 provides, that when "interpreting the
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-(a) must promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law." That Article further
provides in subparagraph 2 that when "interpreting any legislation, and when
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." Id.; see also art. 172
(providing that "(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court-(a)
must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid
to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable,
including-(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity;
and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.").
153. CONSTITUTION arts. 20(3)-(4), 23(1), 159(2)(e), 165(4)(d) (2010) (Kenya).
Article 165(3)(d) of Kenya's Constitution provides that the High Court has jurisdiction
to hear any matter relating to any question with respect to interpretation of the
Constitution "including the determination of (i) the question whether any law is
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution; (ii) the question whether
anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or of any law is
inconsistent with, or in contravention, of this Constitution; (iii) any matter relating ...
to the constitutional relationship between the levels of government." (emphasis added).
Further, Article 23(1) of the 2010 Kenya Constitution authorizes the High Court with
the power to enforce and uphold the Bill of Rights. Article 159(2)(e) of the Constitution
of Kenya (2010) provides that in exercising judicial authority, court shall be guided by
the promotion and protection of the purpose and principles of the Constitution. Article
10 of the Constitution contains a list of national and principles that includes the rule of
law, human rights, democracy and good governance. Article 20(3) provides that in
applying the Bill of Rights, courts shall "develop the law to the extent that it does not
give effect to a right or fundamental freedom," and second, to "adopt the interpretation
that most favours the enforcement of a right or fundamental freedom." Article 20(4)(a)
provides that in exercising their judicial function, courts shall promote the "values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, equity and
freedom." Article 20(4)(b) obliges courts to the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights."
154. CONSTITUTION art. 165(4)(d) (2010) (Kenya); S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
155.

See

BRUCE ACKERMAN,

REVOLUTIONARY

CONSTITUTIONS:

CHARISMATIC

LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW 371-74 (Hary. Univ. Press 2019) (noting that
revolutionary constitutionalism is also associated with the early Republic in the United
States).
156. See generally U.S. CONST.
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difficulty that has characterized debates on judicial review in the
United States. In countries like Kenya and South Africa, new
constitutions have sought to reconstitute old orders that fell away and
that continue to persist-apartheid in the case of South Africa and
authoritarian governance in the case of Kenya.1 57 For example, in the
first case before the South African Constitutional Court after the end
of apartheid, the South African Constitutional Court noted that what
"the Constitution expressly aspires to do is to provide a transition from
these grossly unacceptable features of the past to a conspicuously
contrasting . . . 'future."' 5 8 In contexts like these, what one sees is a

form of revolutionary or transformative constitutionalism through
which a radical transformation of the polity is sought in the
constitution.1 5 9 In this context, judicial review in these revolutionary
contexts is regarded as having a special role both in constituting the
new order as well as in disabling the continuation of the old order.1 60

157. See Willy Mutunga, Chair, S. Afr. Inst. For Policy and Research, Developing
Progressive African Jurisprudence: Reflections from Kenya's 2010 Transformative
Constitution: Preliminary Remarks at the Lameck Goma Annual Lecture 3, 7 (July 27,
2017),
http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Paper-by-Mutunga.pdf
fhttps://perma.cclVYB4-96VU] (archived Sept. 3, 2019) ("That oppressive constitutional
outlook was dismantled in 2010, with the emergence of a democratic constitutional order
following a referendum many years after the first political opening in 1992. At the heart
of it, the making of the Kenyan 2010 Constitution is a story of ordinary citizens striving
and succeeding to reject or as some may say, overthrow the existing social order and to
define a new social, economic, cultural, and political order. Some have spoken of the new
Constitution as representing a second independence. There is no doubt that the
Constitution is a radical document that looks to a future that is very different from our
past, in its values and practices. It seeks to make a fundamental change from the 68
years of colonialism and 54 years of independence.").
158. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 153 (S. Afr.) (quoting S. AFR.
CONST., 1996).
159. See Stephen Gardbaum, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, 15 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 1, 173-200 (2017) (defining revolutionary constitutionalism as "using the constitutionmaking process to attempt to institutionalize and bring to a successful conclusion a
political revolution"); see also Klare, supra note 149, at 150 (defining transformative
constitutionalism as "a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation,
and enforcement committed . . . to transforming a country's political and social
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian
direction.").
Transformative Constitutionalism, 17
160. See Justice
Pius
Langa,
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 351, 357 (2006) (noting that South African courts have a role in
changing the law to "bring it in line with the rights and values for which the Constitution
stands"); Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 42-48 (1994) (discussing how courts can read the Bill of Rights
in a way that builds a culture of justification); see also Justice Albie Sachs, Judicial
Review in Constitutional Systems, YALE L. SCH. (Oct. 5, 2013), https://law.yale.edulylstoday/yale-law-school-videos/judicial-review-constitutional-systems
[https://perma.cc/5NZM-EEBK] (archived Sept. 3, 2019) (contrasting the role of judicial
review in South Africa from that of the commonwealth and European models of judicial
review).
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The constitutionalization of judicial review raises an important
question: Why is judicial review constitutionally provided? In other
words, why was it not left out of the text of the constitution, as is the
case in the United States?
This Article's examples of South Africa and Kenya will also show
that the use of judicial review by nonstate actors is often one venue
among other venues through which actors engage in multidimensional
struggles to advance their causes. Because of the types of functions
expected of judicial review under the revolutionary conditions of these
new democracies, scholars inordinately focus on judicial review while
losing sight of the larger picture of struggles of which courts are only
one venue. 161 In other words, courts are not the sole or even the most
important venue for advancing the causes pursued by litigants in these
courts.
A. The Constitutionalizationof JudicialReview in South Africa
After decades of oppression, discrimination, and a denial of human
rights under apartheid, the South African Constitution of 1996
provided for judicial review. 162 The premise for making judicial review
available was to make it possible for courts to play an important role
in enforcing the values of the post-apartheid Constitution as well as its
Bill of Rights. 163 The South African Constitution also established the
principle of constitutional supremacy, 164 a radical departure from the
16 5
This
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that prevailed before.
recognition of constitutional supremacy together with judicial review
demonstrates that the design of the South African Constitution is not
founded on the basis of an insoluble dichotomy between democracy and
judicial review. 166 Under constitutional supremacy, there is no

161.

See generally GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL

COURTS, supra note

55

(manuscript at Introduction).
162. See S. AFR. CONST., supra note 152 and accompanying text.
163. See id.
164. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.) (noting that the "issues
raised in the present case . . . concern the powers of Parliament and how it is required to
function under the Constitution . ... Constitutional control over such matters goes to
the root of democratic order . . . . It is of crucial importance at this early stage of the
development of our new constitutional order to establish respect for the principle that
the Constitution is supreme.").
165. Section 165(2) of the 1996 South African Constitution provides that: 'The
courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice." S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §
165(2). Section 165(5) further provides that "an order or decision issued by the court
binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies." Id.
166. In fact, some of the early authoritative scholarship on the South African
Constitution was not centered on the judiciary, but rather the entire structure of the
Constitution. See, e.g., HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2010); STU WOOLMAN, THE SELFLESS CONSTITUTION:
EXPERIMENTALISM AND FLOURISHING AS FOUNDATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW
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advance assumption that parliamentary sovereignty makes judicial
review a particular difficulty.1 67
There is further support for the view that democracy and judicial
review are conceptualized as reinforcing rather than opposing values.
Section 39 of the South African Constitution, provides that courts must
adopt an interpretative strategy that upholds the "values that underlie
an open and democratic society." 168 Section 39(2) provides that the
court must "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights." 6 9
This is not to suggest that there are no limits to what courts can
do to directly achieve social, economic, and political transformation.
Clearly courts have institutional limits and the South African
Constitution is not exceptional in this regard. 170 The point is that
courts are an important partner and catalyst when activists and
litigants use them as part of multidimensional strategy of seeking such
change.1 71 Take the example of the litigation on access to essential

-

(2013). For an essay critical of court centered scholarship and that ignores other actors
in the South African constitutional experience, see Richard Calland, Chimera or real
how robust is South Africa's post-1994 Constitutional order?, N.Y. L. SCH. (Nov. 10,
2014), http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Calland.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TVB3-7RKQ] (archived Sept. 24, 2019).
167. In South Africa, constitutional supremacy was designed in part to upstage
parliamentary sovereignty. For an analysis of this, see Heinz Klug, Challenging
Constitutionalismin Post-ApartheidSouth Africa, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES 41-58
(Univ. of Wisconsin 2016).
168. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §39(a); see also Dikgang Moseneke, The balance
between robust constitutionalism and the democratic process, Seabrook Chambers
Public Lecture, Univ. of Melbourne Law Sch. 17 (June 16, 2016) (arguing that
"Democracy should no longer be understood as a political community governed by the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, but rather one governed by the principle of
constitutional supremacy.").
169. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §39(2). The 2010 Kenyan Constitution follows a similar
path in this respect. See generally GATHII, KENYA'S JUDICIARY, supra note 52.
170. The classic statement of these limits by the South African Constitutional
Court is in Soobramoney v. Ministerof Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S.
Afr.) ("Important though our review functions are, there are areas where institutional
incapacity and appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially cautious.");
see also Kate O'Regan, Helen Suzman Memorial Lecture, Johannesburg (Nov. 22, 2011)
(transcript available at https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/justice-kate-oreganshelen-suzman-memorial-lecture/) [https://perma.cc/Z262-QRPW] (archived Sept. 4,
2019) (opining that courts are not suitable venues for policy determinations and
advocating for judicial modesty). For a critical view of the Soobramoney decision, see
James T. Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 261, 287-89 (2002) (arguing that the court placed resource constraints ahead of
the historical context of discrimination against blacks in South Africa in arriving at its
decision).
171. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 947
(2011) (envisioning a multidimensional framework to effect change).
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medicines in South Africa in the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) v.
Ministry of Health.172
TAC is a nongovernmental organization in South Africa that
works on issues of access to essential medicines for those with HIV and
AIDs in South Africa, a country with one of the highest incidents of
these diseases.1 7 3 TAC's strategies included direct action as well as
teaching South Africans about the biomedical workings of HIV and
174
AIDS of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) as well as their side effects.
These teach-ins were done in workshops in schools, churches, union
halls, and workplaces.175 Its purpose was to educate and to empower
those dealing with the pandemic with community and clinic-based
ARV treatment.1 76 Quite clearly, TAC was operating in many places
77
and not merely filing suit in court1
To achieve its goals, TAC initially unsuccessfully lobbied the
Ministry of Health to provide nationwide access to nevirapine, a drug
for pregnant mothers to prevent infecting their newborn babies with
HIV and AIDS.17 8 It also failed to persuade the ministry and the
government to invoke the emergency provisions that would trigger
exemptions from the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). 179 The South African government assumed a denialist
posture-to the effect that HIV and AIDS were caused by many factors
and not by a virus.18 0 The government declined to roll out a nationwide
effective treatment for preventing mother to child transmission outside
a few pilot sites.' 8
TAC did not give up. Instead, it engaged in a multifaceted
campaign to force the government's hand that included the media,
public discourse and debate, demonstrations, protests, posters, and
occupation of government offices.' 8 2 TAC's founder, Zachie Achmat,
confronted the minister of health on a live television show in which he
argued that there were rising and needless deaths of the poor that
could have been treated if the government made drugs available to
them. 183 Achmat and TAC used their experience from the anti-

172. See, e.g., William Forbath et al., Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional
Reform, and ESR Practice: South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign, in STONES OF
HOPE: How AFRiCAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM

POVERTY
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

HUMAN

RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL

51, 67 (Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., Stan. Univ. Press 2011).
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 60.
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apartheid struggle in their new struggle for access to affordable antiretrovirals. 184 They also combined their activism with ACT-UP, a
group in the United States that had experience lobbying for access to
essential medicines inside and outside of courts. 185
TAC also sued the Ministry of Health based on the South African
Constitutional guarantee of the right to health.' 8 6 TAC claimed that
the government had unreasonably refused to extend access to the
nevirapine drug.18 7 The South African Constitutional Court held that
the government had impaired the right to health care by refusing to
rollout access to nevirapine on a nationwide basis.18 8 The suit against
the government did not displace the TAC's other strategies, including
collaborating with sympathetic government officials.1 89 Even though
the court rejected its argument that social and economic rights had a
substantive minimum core, it nevertheless held the government had
an obligation to reasonably provide access to social and economic rights
progressively and within available resources. 19 0
A lot of academic analysis of the TAC litigation primarily focuses
on whether or not newer constitutions should protect social and
economic rights or on the detailed and abstract points of law raised in
litigation before these courts. 191 These analyses however miss the
bigger picture about how best to understand court struggles. The TAC
litigation shows that it is inaccurate to assume that courts alone are
sufficient to open up policymaking processes to fashion and implement
robust and democratic programs of social provision of social goods, such
as essential medicines. ' 9 2 As William Forbarth and Zachie Achmat
have argued:
Judicial vindication brings little change in actual social provision and tends to
legitimate ongoing deprivations. . . but ... there are often ways to use litigation
to help bring about substantial change by putting litigation into the service of
193
political and social strategies outside the courts.

184. Id. at 61.
185. Id. at 79.
186. Id. at 62.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 70-72.
190. Id. at 66.
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35
(1993) (arguing that Eastern European Constitutions should include both civil and
economic liberties); see also SANDRA LIEBENBERG, Socio-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION (Malcolm Langford et al. eds.,
2010).
192. See Forbath et al., supra note 172, at 52.
193. Id. at 55.
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In other words, TAC used litigation in the service of many-sided
strategies rather than as the primary object of its campaign for
nevirapine.1 94 From this perspective, litigation is only one of several
ways of achieving the moral authority and political leverage to move
19 5
The TAC litigation
the needle towards policies that favor the poor.
was part of a larger decentralized, grassroots empowerment model that
linked the local and global planes of the antipoverty and social rights
advocacy. It also involved serious sustained engagement with national
policy making, state institutions, or national political organizations, as
1 96
William Forbath and Zachie Achmat convincingly show.
TAC's broad campaign, including the litigation, was connected to
its campaign against strong pharmaceutical patent protection that the
South African government argued prevented it from breaking patents
197
to allow for affordable medicines to those who could not afford it.
When global pharmaceutical companies sued the South African
government arguing that its proposed legislation allowing patents to
be broken was illegal, TAC and other groups held mass street
protests. 198 Act-Up, a United States-based group, protested with
placards on the AIDS pandemic behind Al Gore when he announced
his bid for the presidency as a strategy of galvanizing support in the
United States in favor of TAC's campaign against global
pharmaceutical companies.1 99 Ultimately, those companies withdrew
200
Because of the
their suit against the South African government.
broad public support for access to essential medicines in South Africa,
the South African government in an unprecedented move refused to
sign a free trade agreement with the United States that would have
provided for higher pharmaceutical patent protections than it was
20 1
willing to accept.
After close to a decade of reviewing its patent legislation in a
campaign that TAC played a central role in, the South African cabinet
in May 2018 approved a new patent policy that was more in keeping
with the interests of indigent South Africans who could not afford
expensive HIV and AIDS drugs. 202 Further, South Africa has been a

194. Id. at 56.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 52.
197. Id. at 57.
198. James T. Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent
Protectionin U.S. ForeignPolicy, 7 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 267, 290 (2003).
199. Id. at 290-91.
200. James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarationon TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J.L. TECH.
292, 313 (2002).
201. James T. Gathii, The NeoLiberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 469-70 (2011).
202. See New Laws Needed Now To Save Lives, TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN
https://tac.org.za/news/new-laws-needed-now-to-save-lives/
2018),
31,
(May
[https://perma.cc/C28B-BETA] (archived Sep. 4, 2019).
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leader in reviewing its investment regulatory regime as well as its
investment treaties to make it more consistent with its own interests
and priorities. 203 By examining the litigation brought by TAC for
access to AIDS drugs in its broader and larger context, it becomes clear
that arguments about the use of courts and the challenges they raise
in terms
of countermajoritarianism
or
overlegalization
or
overjudicialization miss how to understand such cases.
A final example to buttress the foregoing point is appropriate.
Scholars have begun to recognize that court-centered accounts of
shutting down democratic decision-making fail to take into account
"how ordinary politics can produce escalating forms of conflict." 204
Thus Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegal argue that accounts that
trace conflict over abortion to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe
v. Wade20 5 fail to understand that the genesis over the abortion conflict
predates that decision. 206 These authors show how social movements,
the Catholic Church and Republican party strategists in their
competition for voters "supplies an independent institutional basis for
conflict over abortion." 207 This additional example of how a conflict was
previously understood as arising because of adjudication as a result of
which democratic politics was repressed, offers further support against
the court-centered narrative that Moyn offers in making the case
against judicial review. In many respects, focusing on the political
struggles that eventually led to controversial judicial decisions like Roe
shows how conflicts that eventually get judicialized have already been
escalated elsewhere and that courts are but one institution through
which actors involved in a conflict seek to advance their causes.
B. Understandingthe Role of InternationalCourts in Newly
Democratizing Countries
Recent and forthcoming work has urged for understanding the
workings of African international courts as a new and increasingly
important venue for waging political, social, and legal struggles.208
Since many African countries have weak democratic institutions, and
African international courts provide an additional venue-among a

203. See generally Republic of South Africa Department of Trade and Industry,
BilateralInvestment Treaty Policy FrameworkReview: Government PositionPaper (June
25, 2009), http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/090626 trade-bilateralpolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RNW-F686] (archived Sept. 24, 2019).
204. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegal, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
QuestionsAbout Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2034, 2076 (2011).
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
206. Greenhouse & Siegal, supra note 204, at 2030-31.
207. Id. at 2031.
208.

GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 55.
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variety of options at the domestic level-through which citizens can
20 9
Often unable to
wage their political, social, and legal struggles.
reform interpretations and understandings of their rights within their
domestic legal systems, these activists are increasingly turning to
Africa's international courts. 2 10 As such, many of these activists and
litigants are not engaged in one-off struggles confined to litigation in
African international courts, as is assumed in scholarship on the crisis
of human rights courts. 211 Examining the cases before Africa's
international courts using the one dimensional lens of their lack of
democratic legitimacy because they are at least one step removed from
national politics does not square with how these litigants use these
courts. 2 12 For these litigants, litigation in African international courts

is but one strategy of contesting their governments that is part of a
2 13
broader set of strategies in a variety of venues.
To understand the role of international courts from the foregoing
perspective, one has to pay attention to human rights case law from a
bottom-up approach that examines the motivations and strategies of
the litigators and activists who bring these cases instead of focusing on
abstract ideas about their work. By focusing on the role of these
nonstate actors and the value they attach to ideals like human rights
in their litigation before international courts, rather than from the
perspective of governments, it is possible to see how the cases filed in
these courts are part of a broader strategy of spreading human rights
consciousness and advocating for social, political, and legal change. For
example, activists and opposition political parties use these courts to
promote new norms and ideas about rights, but also to undermine
justifications of authoritarian rule inconsistent with the observance of
2 14
and respect for rights.

209. This is because there are limits to what courts can do to directly achieve social
transformation, but yet, courts are an important partner and catalyst when activists and
litigants use them as part of a multi-dimensional strategy to seek such change. See
NeJaime, supra note 171, at 947; Forbath et al., supra note 172. Notably, litigants and
activists using sub-regional courts often have little power and ability to attain their
objectives through direct political means. For a view on this in another context, see R.C.
Cortner, Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional Cases, 17 J. PUB. L. 287,
287-307 (1968).
210.

GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 55.

211. Id.
212. For an example of scholarship reviewing the democratic legitimacy of
international law and courts, see Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a
DemocraticDeficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 533, 533-62 (2006); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
ConstitutionalistFramework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 907-31 (2004).
213.

GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 55.

214.

In fact, African scholars have recognized the importance of indirect impact

forms of international law norms. See CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMPACT OF THE
AFRICAN CHARTER AND WOMEN'S PROTOCOL IN SELECTED AFRICAN STATES 9 (2012)

(defining indirect influence to include awareness and use by civil society, national human
rights institutions reference to the Women's Protocol in law school curricular and
academic writings); Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the
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When litigants and activists file cases before international courts
in Africa, they succeed in advancing their causes in a number of ways.
This is because when a government defends a case in an international
court, it is often required to provide information about the contested
legal question, such as where and why a detainee without trial is
detained, which in turn allows challengers to engage in a robust
contestation of the government's case, both inside and outside the
courtroom. 215 The importance of litigation providing information to
litigants in political settings where governance is not transparent is a
significant benefit that would unlikely be realized without such
litigation. 216 Such an outcome is evident when a critic of the repressive
Rwandese government was released from a custodial sentence imposed
by a domestic court following a protracted case in the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights.2 17
This Article will directly respond to an idea underlying Moyn's
Article-that the type of human rights litigation found in Africa's
international courts is countermajoritarian. To do so, this Article will
discuss the Katabazi case from Uganda in the East African Court of
Justice, one of Africa's international courts. 2 18
The case arose following the arrest of several individuals who had
just been granted bail by the Ugandan High Court within the precincts
of that court. 2 19 These arrests were carried out on November 16, 2005,
by a paramilitary group of the Ugandan government. 220 The arrests
were described as "the worst attack on judicial independence through
the siege of the High Court." 22 1 Not only did the paramilitary men

Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights1994-2004,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2007) (notably indirect impact is defined by Viljoen and Louw as
incremental change occurring over time).
215. That was the case in Rugumba v. Sec. Gen. of the EAC & Attorney Generalof
Rwanda, Ref. No 8 of 2010, Ruling (EACJ, 1st Inst. Div., 2011) (Tanz.) (where as a result
of the filing of the case, the whereabouts of a detained individual were first disclosed by
the government of Rwanda).
216. GATHII, AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 55.
217. IngabireVictoire Umuhoza v. The Republic of Rwanda, No. 003/2014, African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.] (Nov. 24, 2017),
http://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/003-2014-Ingabire%2OVictoire
%20Umuhoza%20V%20Rwanda%20-%2OJudgement% 2024%2ONovember%202017.pdf
fhttps://perma.cc/5NV3-J44X] (archived Sept. 4, 2019). For further analysis, see James
T. Gathii & Jacquelene Mwangi, The African Court on Human and Peoples'Rightsas a
Legal Opportunity Structure, in REASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA'S
INTERNATIONAL COURTS (forthcoming 2020).
218. See James Katabazi et al. v. Sec'y Gen. of the E. African Cmty. & Att'y Gen.
of the Republic of Uganda, 1 (EACJ Nov. 2007), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/11[NO._1_OF_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MST-3WAU] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).
219. Id. at 1.
220. KITUO CHA KATIBA, EASTERN AFRICA CENTRE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, FIVE YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-2016 10 (2011).
221. Id.
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interfere with the preparation of the bail papers, they also took the
men before a military general court-martial, where they were charged
with unlawful possession of firearms and terrorism under the same
facts that had supported the previous charges for which they had been
granted bail. 22 2 The Ugandan Constitutional Court, on petition from

the Uganda Law Society, declared the detentions unconstitutional and
223
ordered the individuals released from detention.
The Ugandan government failed to comply with that decision, and
a complaint was thereafter filed in one of Africa's international courts,
the East African Court of Justice. 224 The complainants challenged
their rearrest, military charges, and detention as inconsistent with the
provisions of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African
Community. 225 They argued that this conduct, together with the
refusal by the Ugandan government to comply with the bail order,
226
constituted an infringement of their human rights under that treaty.
One of the questions that the East African Court of Justice had to
consider before deciding the case was whether it had jurisdiction over
human rights cases. 22 7 That was an important question because the
relevant provision of the treaty provided that jurisdiction over human
rights cases would be granted to the East African Court of Justice at a
229
future date.2 2 8 Such an extension of jurisdiction had not happened.
This absence of an explicit jurisdictional basis to decide human rights
cases corresponds to the absence of an explicit textual provision in the
U.S. Constitution authorizing judicial review. As we saw above, this
absence of an explicit constitutional basis for judicial review has been
a major source of the illegitimacy of judicial review from adherents of
the countermajoritarian difficulty who prescribe judicial modesty.
Instead of construing its jurisdiction to strictly conform to this treaty

222. James Katabazi et al. v. Sec'y Gen. of the E. African Cmty. & Att'y Gen. of the
Republic of Uganda, 2 (EACJ Nov. 2007), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
NO._1_OF_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MST-3WAU] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2-3.
225. Id. at 3.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 14 ("Does this court have jurisdiction to deal with human rights
issues?").
228. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Court of Justice, art. 27(2),
Aug. 20, 2007 ("The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights
jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date. To this
end, the Partner States shall conclude a protocol to operationalize the extended
jurisdiction.").
229. James Katabazi et al. v. Sec'y Gen. of the E. African Cmty. & Att'y Gen. of the
Republic of Uganda, 15 (EACJ Nov. 2007), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
NO._1_OF_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MST-3WAU] (archived Sept. 4, 2019) (The court
noted that it was "very clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights requires a
determination of the Council and a conclusion of a protocol to that effect. Both of those
steps have not been taken. It follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on
disputes concerning violation of human rights per se.").
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provision consistently with adherence to judicial modesty in the Justice
Frankfurter tradition, the East African Court of Justice dismissed this
jurisdictional challenge and held it had a responsibility not to "abdicate
from exercising its jurisdiction . . . merely because the reference
includes allegation[s] of human rights violation[s]." 230 Referring to
other provisions of the relevant treaty that embodied human rights,
the court held that it had an obligation to "provide a check on the
exercise of the responsibility .

.

. to protect the rule of law," and that

Uganda's conduct constituted "an unacceptable and dangerous
precedent, which would undermine the rule of law." 23 1 The Katabazi
case established a new cause of action for challenging violations of
human rights of EAC member states. This in turn opened the door to
a stream of human rights cases before the East African Court of
Justice.

232

For scholars like Moyn who argue human rights is in crisis, the
East African Court of Justice's assumption of jurisdiction over human
rights cases in the absence of an explicit basis for doing so is
problematic.2 3 3 If Moyn's countermajoritarian difficulty is applied, the
Katabazi decisions in both the Ugandan Constitutional Court and the
East African Court of Justice would not have been possible. After all,
the ruling party in Uganda that has been in power since the mid-1980s
has won every national election with a very high majority of seats in
Parliament. 234 These judicial decisions against the ruling party in
Uganda would therefore be countermajoritarian from the perspective
advocated by Moyn. Such an argument would miss the point.
Analyzing these cases from the assumptions embedded in the
countermajoritarian difficulty would legitimize the authoritarian
governance of regimes like the one in Uganda. Further, proceeding
from assumptions like the countermajoritarian difficulty overlooks the
strategies of litigants such as those in the TAC case in South Africa

230. Id. at 16.
231. Id. at 22-23.
232. See James T. Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East
African Court of Justice's Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249, 25459 (2013) [hereinafter Gathii, Mission Creep].
233. See Ally Possi,'Strikinga Balance Between Community Norms and Human
Rights: The Continuing Struggle of the East African Court of Justice, 15 AFR. HUM. RTS.
L.J. 192, 203 (2015) (arguing that "despite the existing limitations to adjudicate human
rights disputes, it is undeniable that the EACJ has adopted some kind of judicial
activism when adjudicating cases with human rights allegations. In such circumstances,
it is likely to provoke controversy among member states. It can also be propounded that
the continuing politicization of the EACJ's human rights jurisdiction may have been
caused by the Court's activism.").
234. See generally JAMES T. GATHII, InternationalCourts as CoordinationDevices
for Opposition Parties: The Case of the East African Court of Justice, in REASSESSING
THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL COURTS (forthcoming 2020).
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and those in the Ugandan Katabazi case. These litigants were not
using courts in isolation, but rather they were engaged in multiple
strategies including street protests, working with allies in parliament,
writing editorials in the media, as well as appealing to like-minded
groups to advance their causes. 2 35 In addition to filing the case in the
East African Court of Justice, the Katabazilitigants had a parallel case
in the Ugandan Constitutional Court in which they had already
prevailed. 236 By filing the case in the East African Court of Justice, the
strategy forced the Ugandan government to defend the litigation in a
forum it did not control. 237 The case in the East African Court of
Justice helped the Katabazi plaintiffs keep the repressive conduct of
the Ugandan government in the spotlight for a prolonged period of time
as the government engaged in figuring out how best to respond to the
2 38
Such
issues the cases raised both inside and outside the courtroom.
a multipronged strategy lended credibility and legitimacy to the
cause(s) the litigants were pursuing. In addition, the cases helped them
to communicate and advance their agenda of social, political, or legal
change with other Ugandans. 239 International courts therefore give
litigants a new mechanism of political expression that is disruptive of
ordinary democratic politics based at the national level.
Cases like the Katabazi case when decided by an international
court are sometimes regarded as negative examples of judicial
activism. Such a perspective fails to acknowledge how these
international courts, just as national courts, are invited "to interpret
highly abstract . . . clauses invoking equality, liberty, freedom of

speech, property or due process." 240 In the Katabazi case, the court was
invited to establish whether or not the rearrests, detention, and
military trials of individuals who had already been granted bail by the
High Court of Uganda was consistent with the fundamental principle
of the rule of law in the Treaty for the Establishment of the East
African Community. It is precisely the kind of elaborate arguments of
policy that courts engage in when trying to figure out which concern
should prevail over others in a particular case that makes going to
court for litigants and activists very attractive. Thus, it is appropriate
when the occasion calls for it to dethrone the view of courts as an
institution that authoritatively protects clearly defined rights. Instead,
it may be best on those occasions to see the role of these courts as the
litigants who use them-as one venue among others that these actors
use to achieve their goals.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See Gathii, Mission Creep, supra note 232.
Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Kumm, supra note 212, at 925.
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V. CONCLUSION

Constitutions written in light of the experiences of the twentieth
century, such as apartheid and fascism, are based on the principle of
constitutional supremacy. 241 That means that a majority cannot
amend normative commitments, such as fundamental rights and
freedoms, and when they do those whose rights have been violated can
go to courts for judicial relief By contrast, the relationship between
judicial review and democracy that Moyn offers us is predicated on the
two being opposed to each other. This view of the relationship between
judicial review and democracy has been shaped by the specific
historiography of the United States. This Article has argued that there
are alternative and more compelling accounts of the relationship
between judicial review and democracy developed in the crucible of
anticolonial and antifascist struggles. 242 This Article has offered
accounts from South Africa to illustrate how judicial review was
designed to counter the legacy of apartheid. In so doing, this Article
has argued that it is important to allow for plural accounts not only of
human rights but also of judicial review, and the relationship these
normative values have with democracy. 243 From the perspective
offered in this Article, "[a] ccounts which treat human rights as a single
coherent discourse or a clear canonical set of international legal texts
inevitably oversimplify the immeasurable complicated interactions
among innumerable historical agents that contribute to the various
commitments that people call human rights." 244
Those that work on critical approaches in international law, such
as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), are all too
familiar with hegemonic discourses, including those of international
human rights law. 245 Such hegemonic discourses that are prescribed
for the entire world, even when they have arisen in very contingent
historical circumstances, cannot advance the causes of human
rights. 246

241. Moseneke, supra note 168, at 15-16.
242. Joseph R. Slaughter, Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New
Historiography,and the End of the Third World, 40 HUM. RTS. Q. 735, 737 (2018); see
also Zarakol, supra note 141, at 77 (noting the historical contingency of scholarship on
the relationship between democracy and judicial review that does not examine the
experiences of non-Western societies).
243. Slaughter, supra note 242, at 737.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., James T. Gathii, The Agenda of Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL), in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND
FRONTIERS (forthcoming 2019).
246. Makau wa Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human
Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 209 (2001) (arguing that "human rights should be based
not just on American or European legal traditions but also on other cultural milieus,"
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This Article has argued that the countermajoritarian difficulty is
a peculiarly American understanding of the relationship between
democracy and judicial review. Further, this very particular
understanding of this relationship does not have at its center a
normative commitment to values such as human rights. Rather, at its
center, it has a commitment to democracy defined as majority rule.
Under this understanding, elections and legislatures are the preferred
modes of resolving and settling democratic questions. In a
constitutional democracy by contrast and as envisaged in this Article,
it is presupposed that through a bill of rights, the people have provided
"precautions or pre-commitments against their own imperfections or
harmful future desires and bind themselves to their initial agreement
2 47
To
on the basic rules and rights that specify their sovereignty."
ensure this, they empower courts to police those precautions and
precommitments. As such, this Article has argued that Moyn's
prescription of the countermajoritarian difficulty and judicial modesty
based on his understanding of Justice Frankfurter is not only
historically bound up with the specific history of the United States, but
that it is also insufficiently attentive to the normative commitment to
the need for judicial review to guard against majoritarian legislative
excesses that violate the rights of others, especially minorities. This
very United States-specific understanding of this relationship that
presupposes an insoluble tension between judicial review and
not be exported globally
and should
cannot
democracy,
unproblematically. Barry Sullivan has recently convincingly shown
that far from adopting Justice Frankfurter's noninterventionist
judicial philosophy to protect the democratic process from majorities
hostile to voting minorities, the U.S. Supreme Court "has not only
declined to intervene when overreaching majorities have used their
authority to set electoral rules entrenching their own dominance, the
Court also has invalidated legislation on those rare occasions when the
political process has actually produced democracy-enforcing
legislation." 24 8 In other words, if Justice Frankfurter's view of judicial
modesty was problematic because for him disenfranchised electoral
minorities had to go back to the electoral majorities that had

such as indigenous, non-European traditions of Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the
Americas); see also Makau wa Mutua, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the
Abolitionist Paradigmin Africa, 17 MicH. J. INT'L L. 591 (1996).
247. Ran Hirschl, PreservingHegemony? Assessing the PoliticalOrigins of the EU
Constitution, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 273 (2005).
248. Sullivan, supra note 103 (manuscript at 27-28) (arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court's reluctance to protect disenfranchised minorities exemplifies how the
imperfections of democracy in the US); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that presupposing a wellfunctioning democracy and rights respecting legislatures unlimited by judicial review
must be rejected). John Hart Ely's representation reinforcing justification of judicial
review to ensure democracy is operating well is preferable. See HART ELY, supra note
103.

2019]

BEYOND SAMUEL MOYN'S COUNTERMAJORITARL4NDIFFICULTY

1279

disenfranchised them for relief, the current Supreme Court seeks to
completely disentangle itself from overseeing the electoral process
when disenfranchised voters approach it for relief. 249 Thus even in the
United States, reviving Justice Frankfurter's judicial modesty would
not provide relief for disenfranchised majorities.
These narrow understandings of judicial review are inconsistent
with the role judicial review is designed to serve in countries that have
adopted transformative constitutions like South Africa and Kenya. In
these countries, there is a central commitment to ensuring that
majorities do not run roughshod over minorities and that when
majorities do so those that suffered harms can go to courts for relief. In
countries like these, therefore, paying attention to the specific reasons
why judicial review is adopted is an important first step in
understanding its nature and function. 250
Further, analysis like Moyn's that exclusively focuses on judicial
review makes invisible the ways in which actors use courts and other
sites of contestation that they are simultaneously engaging in with
their interlocutors inside and outside of government. In other words,
beyond protecting democracy, litigants go to courts as one among many
forums to advance their causes. By prescribing a single historically
contingent model of judicial review for national and international
courts, Moyn forecloses the plurality that characterizes how judicial
review works in different parts of the world as well as how different
actors use it. For these reasons and all the reasons advanced in this
Article, his effort to simplify and universalize his preferred theory of
how individuals should understand the relationship between
democracy and judicial review does not withstand critical scrutiny and
should be rejected.

249. See Sullivan, supra note 103.
250. For the case that historical experiences such as apartheid in South Africa
informed the particular nature of the Constitution, see Moseneke, supra note 168, at 11
(arguing that "Under apartheid, parliament enjoyed supremacy and no Constitution or
bill of rights provided any fetter on its legislative powers. Oppressive laws passed by
parliament could, for the most part, not be challenged in the courts. The apartheid
regime was sustained by lack of accountability and the construct of parliamentary
sovereignty.").

